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Introduction 
 
Rapid economic growth and social change have produced a large volume of urban new 
middle class in East Asia.   
From kohdo keizai seicho (rapid economic growth) in 1960s onwards, Japan 
produced a large volume of middle classes.  In accordance with the growth of new 
middle class, a lot of sociologists have come to pay attention to these emerging new 
classes in Japan.  
Though the concept of “middle classes”, or “class” itself, is not in fashion in 
contemporary Japan due to her affluence and standardized way of life (Hara and Seiyama, 
1999: 214; Hara, 2000: 35), other East Asian countries still use the concept of “urban 
middle classes” in describing their changing societies.  
In case of Korea, for example, political roles and ideological traits of middle 
classes have been paid attention to since late 80s when they have accomplished 
democratization and political reform (Yang, 2005:158).  Taiwanese sociologists also used 
a lot of energy in grasping socio-political traits of emerging middle classes from 1980s 
(Hsiao, 1999) as well as Hong Kongnese and Singaporean counterparts (Lui and Wang, 
2003; Tan, 2004)   
It is probably in China now that the analysis of middle classes is most popular 
among sociologists in East Asian countries.  Drastic marketization and rapid economic 
development under socialist regime is now producing unique middle classes, sometimes 
called bailing (white-collar), and many sociologists have been trying to measure their 
volume or characterize their socio-political orientations through empirical studies (Xu, 
2000: Lu, 2002: Zhou, 2005). 
In spite of, or because of, “localization” of middle class research in each country, 
comparative analysis of middle classes has been very rare in East Asia except several cases 
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(Sonoda, 2005). Hsiao’s (1999, 2001) extensive research of middle classes in Northeast Asia 
and Southeast Asia is a pioneering project which produced many breakthroughs of the 
research in these regions, but these two projects were conducted independently and no 
paper was published dealing with middle classes in both Northeast and Southeast Asian 
countries.  Hattori’s (2002) project is trying to cover middle class issues in Korea, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, and Sonoda’s (2005) research 
covers Korea, China and Hong Kong, but no common framework or data is used in these 
projects. 
Such lack of extensive East Asia-wide research is primarily due to lack of good 
data archive on social stratification in this region.  In other words, East Asia is a place 
where “data accumulation and service have long remained until recently improved” 
(Inoguchi, 2006: 19), which makes it difficult to formulate hypotheses on East Asian 
middle classes by using empirical data. 
In this paper, the author explores some hypotheses on new middle class in 
contrast with working class to draw a rough picture of their characteristics by using the 
data of AsiaBarometer survey in 20063. 
 
Data 
 
AsiaBarometer was initiated and promoted by Prof. Inoguchi, a political scientist in Japan 
(Inoguchi, 2005; 2006). This large scale survey started from 2003, and the survey has been 
conducted annually whose covering countries differ from year to year4.  
Because AsiaBarometer was originally deigned to measure mainly political 
orientations and attitudes in Asian countries from Japan to Afghanistan, such 
sociologically important items as respondent’s occupational prestige or class identification, 
respondent’s parents’ educational background and occupation, are excluded from the 
questionnaire.  It is, therefore, impossible to measure inter-generational mobility by 
using AsiaBarometer 2006 data, but some items included in the questionnaire might 
illustrate urban middle classes’ socio-cultural background and socio-political orientations. 
 AsiaBarometer 2006 contains roughly 1000 samples in Japan, South Korea, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, Vietnam, Singapore, and 2000 samples in mainland China.  Quota 
sampling method is adopted due to the difficulty of conducting random sampling in these 
                             
3 It is a well-known fact that middle classes are composed of new middle class and old middle class and 
they show some different traits.  It is desirable, therefore, to distinguish them so that our observation 
will be more meaningful. Because sample size of old middle class is small, however, we could not help 
excluding it from our analysis.   
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areas, and all the data are collected from cities in different areas because of the budget 
constraints.  
In this paper, we categorized those who are 1) senior manager (company director, 
no lower in rank than a manager of a company section in a company with 300 or more 
employees, or a manager of a department in a company with less than 300 employees), 2) 
employed professional or specialist (hospital doctors, employed lawyers, engineers, etc.), 
3) clerical worker as “new middle class” and those who are 1) manual workers (including 
skilled and semi-skilled), 2) drivers, 3) sales workers, or 4) other workers as “working 
class” (Konno, 2006: 189) and try to make their comparison. 
 Table 1 shows the volume of new middle class and working class in our samples.   
 
Table 1: Volume of New Middle Class and Working Class in Confucian Asia 
  New Middle Class Working Class Total 
China 458 366 824 
Hong Kong 269 331 600 
Japan 174 374 548 
Korea 151 188 339 
Singapore 307 345 652 
Taiwan 176 330 506 
Vietnam 150 449 599 
Total 1685 2383 4068 
 
 
Hypotheses 
  
What are the distinctive features of new middle class in comparison with working class in 
East Asia?  In order to grasp their general traits, we prepared ten hypotheses tentatively, 
five of which deal with their socio-cultural background and the rest of which is concerned 
with their socio-political orientations. 
 
Socio-cultural Background 
 
According to Hsiao (1999: 4), large part of new middle class in Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and Singapore belongs to first generation whose parents were industrial workers or 
farmers before 1970s.  It is certain that such newly developing countries like China are 
having more and more young employees who are working in modern offices or 
subsidiaries of multinational companies.  If this is the case, we can expect that 
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Hypothesis 1a: Those who belong to new middle class are younger than those who 
belong to working class.  
 
With the expansion of commercial and service sector, large proportion of female 
workers finds their job in these sectors.  According to Seiyama (2000:22), “growing 
number of professional occupations especially in educational or medical sectors allowed 
married female workers to continue their career because of their ‘femininity,’ while 
increasing number of clerical works created job opportunities for women” in Japan, but if 
this logic can be applied to industrialization in all over East Asia , we can say that 
 
Hypothesis 1b: New middle class has larger proportion of female than working class. 
 
 As is often pointed out, emergence of new middle class goes hand in hand with 
the spread of higher education.  As the spread of meritocracy, people from lower class 
also come to take part in competition of entrance examination for university to attain 
much better social status as “white collar” (Takeuchi, 1995: 86-88).  If so,  
 
Hypothesis 1c: New middle class has more university graduates than working class. 
 
 Globalization and urban middle classes are two keywords of hybridization or 
homogenization of cultures in East Asia. According to Aoki (2005), “In those (East Asian) 
countries or regions which attained economic development to some extent, urban middle 
classes are on the rise.  Those who belong to these classes are highly educated, share 
lifestyles, knowledge or tastes.  They are free from narrow-sighted nationalism or 
religious fundamentalism because their daily life is exposed to globalization.” If what 
Aoki says is right,  
 
Hypothesis 1d: New middle class’ daily life is more exposed to globalization than that 
of working class. 
 
 It is frequently reported that newly emerging middle class family respects 
education for their children and sometimes they send their children abroad to study 
foreign languages, especially English, with their mother.  In case of Korea, for example, 
those who stay in Korea to send money for their children and wife abroad are call kirogi 
appa (father of wild goose) as a “social disease” of middle classes which puts too much 
emphasis on educational attainment through studying abroad (Cha, 2005: 59).  If so is the 
case with other East Asian countries,  
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Hypothesis 1e:  New middle class has more fluent English-speaking population than 
working class. 
 
Socio-Political Orientations 
 
Needless to say, new middle class is the product of industrialization and modernization. 
It is natural to assume that people who belong to new middle class shows those 
socio-political orientations which are related with “modernity.”  In fact, Zhang (2005: 
191) discusses that one of the social functions of new middle class is to establish modern 
values or norms in China.  
 In AsiaBarometer, two questions have to do with “traditional-modern” nexus. 
One is about nepotism, which shows “particularistic” value, and the other is about 
secularization of religious behavior.  
 
Hypothesis 2a: New middle class is more prone to support anti-nepotism than 
working class.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: New middle class is more secularized than working class. 
 
 New middle class in East Asia used to be regarded as a promising actor of social 
movement through which we can attain more gender-equal, environmental-oriented, 
democratic society (Rodin, 1996).  Hsiao (1995: 71) points out new middle class in Taipei 
is concerned with quality of life including environmental issues or social welfare issues, 
and major players of consumer movements, environmental protection movements, 
women’s movements, and democratic movements are those who belong to new middle 
class.  If so, we can say that 
 
Hypothesis 2c: New middle class is more supportive of gender-equality policy than 
working class. 
 
Hypothesis 2d: New middle class is more concerned about environmental issues than 
working class. 
 
Hypothesis 2e: New middle class has more pro-democratic attitude than working 
class. 
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Diversity among Societies 
 
It is a sensitive issue how much we can deal with seven societies’ data as one unit. Area 
study specialists are apt to put an emphasis on the “uniqueness” of the each society they 
are studying and some of their observations are worthy of consideration. Sonoda (2005, 
2006b), for example, points out that income discrepancy and gap of social status between 
middle class and working class is larger in China than in Japan, and many scholars point 
out cultural diversity of middle class among East Asian countries (Hsiao, 1999: 45-47; 
Hattori, 2002: 20).  If so, 
 
Hypothesis 3: Gap between urban new middle class and working class or 
characteristics of urban middle classes per se shows different patterns among 
societies. 
 
 
Results of Analysis 
 
Test of Ten Hypotheses 
 
In order to verify ten hypotheses above, it is necessary to make operation definition of 
some concepts.  
 As to the exposure to globalization, we prepared six questions in Q3 whether 1) 
respondent’s family member or relative lives in another country, 2) respondent has 
traveled abroad at least three times in the past three years, 3) respondent has friends who 
are from other countries, 4) respondent watches foreign-produced programs on TV, 5) 
respondent has communication with people in other countries via the Internet or email,  
and 6) respondent has contact with organizations or people in other countries in job, and 
we scored “globalization score” ranging from six points to zero point by adding the 
number of items that respondent says “yes.”  
 As to “anti-nepotism”, we prepared such question as “In the company’s 
employment examinations, a relative of yours got the second highest grade, scoring only 
marginally less than the candidate with the highest grade.  In such a case, which person 
would you employ?” in Q15. 
 Secularization, or religiosity, was measured by the question in Q23, “How often 
do you pray or mediate?” and the score was got from 1 point (Never) to 5 points (Daily). 
 Support of gender-equality policy (Q32j) and environmental policy (Q32a) were 
measured by the answers to the question how much government should spend in 
improvement of the social status of women or the environment, whose scores range from 
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1 point (spend much less) to 5 points (spend much more). 
 Finally, pro-democratic attitude was scaled by the answer to the question in 
Q38d whether the respondent thinks democratic political system is very good (3 points), 
fairly good (2 points), or bad (1 point) for his or her country.  
 Because age, exposure to globalization, religiosity, support of gender-equality 
policy and environmental policy, pro-democratic attitude is numerical data, we used t-test 
to check whether new middle class and working class show statistically significant 
difference in terms of their average score, and cross-tabulation analysis was used in other 
variables. The results of analysis are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Results of Test of Ten Hypotheses 
 
New Middle 
Class 
Working 
Class 
Sig. Units (Variables) 
1a 36.35 39.53 ++ Years Old(Age) 
1b 47.8 64.5 ++ % of Male (Sex) 
1c 59.4 16.3 ++ 
% of College/University Graduate  
(Academic Career) 
1d 1.47 0.98 ++ 6 Point Scale (Exposure to Globalization) 
1e 18.9 6.5 ++ % of Fluent Speaker of English (Fluency of English) 
2a 68.2 65.6  
% of "The person with the highest grade" 
(Anti-Nepotism) 
2b 2.06 2.14  5 Point Scale (Religiosity) 
2c 3.49 3.40 ++ 5 Point Scale (Support of Gender-equality Policy) 
2d 3.82 3.67 ++ 5 Point Scale (Support of Environmental Policy) 
2e 2.32 2.25 ++ 3 Point Scale (Pro-Democracy) 
Note)   ++ Significant at .01 level 
 
It is evident that variables on socio-cultural background are more effective in 
dividing new middle class and working class than socio-political variables in Confucian 
Asia.  In other words, it is possible to characterize new middle class by age, sex, 
academic career, exposure to globalization, or English-speaking population easily, but it’s 
difficult to distinguish Confucian Asian new middle class from working class by their 
socio-political orientations, especially their anti-nepotism attitude or religiosity.  
 
Hypothesis-testing of Diversity among Societies 
 
Then, how much diversity of the gap between new middle class and working class can be 
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seen in Confucian Asian societies?  Table 3 shows the result of t-test and cross-tabulation 
analysis about ten hypotheses mentioned above in each society.   
 
Table 3: Diversity among Societies 
  China 
Hong 
Kong  
Japan Korea Singapore Taiwan Vietnam 
 
Among 
Societies
 
1a △ ○ × ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
1b ○ ○ △ × ○ ○ × ○ 
1c ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
1d ○ ○ △ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
1e ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
2a × △ × × × × × ○ 
2b × ▲ × × × × ○ ○ 
2c △ △ △ × × △ × ○ 
2d △ × × △ × × △ ○ 
2e △ × × × × × -- --- 
 
Note) ○ Verified at .01 Level;  △ Verified at .05 Level;  × Not Significant;  
▲ Countered at .05 Level;   -- No Data Available  
  
 Interestingly, academic career, exposure to globalization, and fluency of English 
are three statistically significant factors which distinguish between new middle class and 
working class in every society.   On the other hand, however, the rest eight hypotheses 
were verified in some, not all, countries, and the characteristics of new middle class in 
each society differs from each other, which supports hypothesis 3 on diversity among 
societies. 
 Japan is the only country where average age of new middle class (42.33 years 
old) is similar to that of working class (41.24 years old), probably because Japan has the 
longest history of having new middle class.  In other societies, however, new middle 
class is relatively younger than the working class probably due to recent development of 
new middle class in these societies (see Figure 1). 
As to sex composition, Korea and Vietnam are the exceptions in the sense that 
they have equal percentage of male employees in new middle class and working class. 
The reason, however, seems to be different between Korea and Vietnam.  Korea is still 
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Figure 1: Average Age of New Middle Class and Working Class (Unit: Years Old) 
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
44
Ch
ina
Ho
ng
 Ko
ng
Ja
pa
n
Ko
rea
Sin
ga
po
re
Ta
iw
an
Vi
etn
am
New Middle Class Working Class
 
 
 “male dominant society” where male employees dominate not only working class but 
also new middle class, while Vietnam inherits the legacy of egalitarian regime where 
equal participation in the workplace by both sex has been advocated for a long time under 
socialist rule (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Sex Composition of New Middle Class and Working Class (Unit: %) 
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Two Clusters of New Middle Class 
 
Big diversity among countries makes it worth while to categorize Confucian Asian new 
middle class into several types.   
Figure 3 shows composition of two clusters of new middle class which were got 
by two-step cluster analysis by using ten variables in each society; one can be called 
“English-speaking type” (Singaporean and some part of Hong Kongese; n=307) and the 
other can be called “non-English speaking type” or just “Confucian type” (Japanese, South 
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Korean, Chinese, Taiwanese, and some part of Hong Kongnese; n=1117)5 because of the 
following reasons6.  
 
Figure 3: Composition of Two Clusters of Middle Classes in Confucian Asia 
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 Firstly, Cluster 1 is outstandingly fluent in English and more exposed to 
globalization than Cluster 2 (see Figure 4 and Figure 5). It is easily understood that 
fluency of English makes it possible for Cluster 1 to enjoy their globalized life, but it 
doesn’t mean that they are free from religious beliefs. On the contrary, new middle class 
of Cluster 2 is more educated and secularized than that of Cluster 1 (see Figure 5 and 
Figure 6), which is another reason why Cluster 2 can be called “Confucian type7.”  
 Last, but not least, difference between Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 is that the former is 
more generous to nepotism (see Figure 7).  In other words, those who answered “my 
relative” when asked whether they employ a person with highest grade or their relative 
can be seen more in Cluster 1 than in Cluster 2.  This is the last reason why Cluster 1 can 
be named “Confucian type” which puts more emphasis on such particularistic ties as 
blood relationship8. 
 
                             
5 Because we were not allowed to ask informants’ ideas on politics in Vietnam, Vietnamese samples are 
excluded from cluster analysis. 
 
6  This finding is basically similar to the one that the author got through the analysis of ASEAN+3 data 
in 2004 (Sonoda, 2006a).  
 
7 Confucianism is sometimes called “education-oriented” and “secularized” ethics, but Kaji (1990:226) 
maintains that essence of Confucianism is not in rituality but in religiosity in the sense that those who 
live in Confucian cultures still worship ancestors and have strong filial piety. Our analysis reveals, 
however, that new middle class in Confucian cultures pray or mediate in their daily life only on special 
occasions, which doesn’t support Kaji’s observations.  
 
8 There are many documents which point out Confucian society’s preference for blood relation ties.  As 
to comparative study of Japan and China from this angle, see Sonoda (2001). 
 11
Figure 4: Fluency of English in Two Clusters 
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Figure 5: Socio-cultural Background and Socio-political Orientations in Two Clusters 
(Unit: Points) 
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Figure 6: Academic Career of Two Clusters 
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Note) “Low” is junior high graduate level, “Middle” is high school graduate level, and “High” is 
college/university graduate level. 
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Figure 7: Anti-Nepotism Attitudes of Two Clusters 
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Summary and Discussion 
 
Data of AsiaBarometer survey in 2006 collected in seven Confucian Asian societies 
revealed the following findings. 
 New middle class is much better educated, more exposed to globalization, and 
more fluent speaker of English than working class in every country in Confucian Asia. 
They are younger except in Japan and have more female employees except in Korea and 
Vietnam than working class.  
 As to Socio-political orientations, however, new middle class doesn’t show any 
clear and distinctive characteristics in every society.  They are more supportive of 
gender-equality policy and environmental protection and pro-democratic than working 
class, but we cannot see any clear distinction between them in some societies like 
Singapore. 
 According to the result of our cluster analysis, there are two types of new middle 
class in East Asia: one is “English-speaking type” and the other is “Confucian type.”  The 
latter is huge in volume, and they are much educated but less exposed to globalization 
probably due to their lacking in fluency of English.  They are more secularized and 
particularistic than “English-speaking type” in nature. 
 All in all, new middle class in Singapore shows different traits than its 
counterparts in other Confucian societies in the sense that their life is very globalized on 
the one hand and their socio-political orientations do not show any distinctiveness which 
has been identified with new middle classes in advanced societies on the other.   
Interestingly, only about 10% of new middle class in Hong Kong, which has a 
long tradition of English education under British rule just like Singapore does, belong to 
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“English-speaking type,” which might have something to do with the handover of Hong 
Kong to China. In order to verify it, however, we need to trace historical change over time.   
Socio-cultural background and socio-political orientations of new middle class in 
Confucian Asia have been formed in their historical contexts. They might include, length 
of time after the birth of new middle class, influence of socialist regime, tradition of 
English-learning education, cultural legacy of Confucianism, and so on.  These factors 
have been contributing to form unique characteristics of new middle class in some way or 
other.  
One of the contributions of AsiaBarometer is that we can get a rough picture of 
new middle class in each society on empirical basis.  In order to draw much fine picture, 
however, we need to organize international research team composed of specialists in each 
society. It is not too much to say that the analysis of AsiaBarometer’s data is just a starting 
point for our further exploration of new middle class issues in Confucian Asia. 
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